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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Improving  information  about  individual  opportunity  costs  of  defor-
estation  agents  has  the potential  to  increase  the  efﬁciency  of  REDD
when  it takes  the  form  of  a  payment  for environmental  services
scheme. However,  objectives  pursued  in  REDD  projects  may  vary
across  policy  makers.  Within  a theoretical  framework,  this  paper
explores  the impacts  of  different  policy  objectives  under  two oppor-
tunity  cost  settings:  asymmetric  and  full information.  For  a  policy
maker  aiming  to maximize  net  income  from  REDD,  having  full  infor-
mation  may  not  increase  the  amount  of  forest  conserved  but  could
lead  to  a  redistribution  of rents  away  from  agents.  By  contrast,  for
an  environmental  policy  maker  focused  on maximizing  the  amount
of  forest  conserved  under  REDD  having  full  information  increases
the  amount  of forest  conserved  while  reducing  the  rents  received
by  agents.  For  a policy  maker  pursuing  poverty  alleviation  objec-
tives  in  REDD-affected  communities,  having  full  information  makes
no  difference  to overall  welfare  as  rents  remain  with  agents.  The
amount  of deforestation  avoided  will  at least  be as  high  as  under
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asymmetric  information.  These  results  are  illustrated  with  data  col-
lected on  opportunity  costs  in  Amazonas  State,  Brazil.
©  2013  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
With tropical deforestation accounting for up to a ﬁfth of global, anthropogenic carbon dioxide
emissions (van der Werf et al., 2009; IPCC, 1997), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degra-
dation (REDD) has been positioned as a potentially cost-effective climate change mitigation strategy
(Stern, 2007; Eliasch, 2008; Engel and Palmer, 2009). Long-term ﬁnance is uncertain, although an
international carbon market and/or voluntary funds could play a role (see Neeff and Ascui, 2009).
Regardless of how ﬁnance is sourced for REDD, incentive payments or payments for environmental
services (PES) schemes are often emphasized as a key policy tool for internalizing the forest car-
bon externality (Angelsen, 2010; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Palmer, 2011).1 A key selling point is their
potential cost-effectiveness compared to other policy options (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and
Simpson, 2002; Muller and Albers, 2004; Groom and Palmer, 2010). Moreover, they are often pro-
posed as efﬁcient policy tools for achieving REDD in developing countries (e.g. Angelsen, 2008; Leplay
et al., 2011).
Increased knowledge about the opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation is often cited as a pre-
requisite for the efﬁcient implementation of payments schemes to curb deforestation (e.g. Pagiola and
Bosquet, 2009). Yet as a policy objective, efﬁciency alone is rarely observed in practice. Instead, such
schemes are often implemented with differing and sometimes multiple policy objectives. For example,
in many developing countries both environmental and development objectives are often central (see
Bulte et al., 2008). In this paper, we investigate the impacts of different policy objectives under two
informational settings regarding the opportunity costs of deforestation agents: asymmetric and full
information. A simple payments model is developed in which a policy maker offers a price to agents
in order to reduce deforestation. The policy maker aims for one of the three types of objectives: maxi-
mizing the net income from REDD; maximizing the amount of forest prevented from being deforested
in the area; or, alleviating poverty. The last speciﬁcally focuses on increasing welfare among agents
participating in the scheme. The policy maker can then either sell the carbon credits derived on an
international carbon market or it can be retributed through an international REDD fund.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on how differing policy objectives may  inﬂuence forest outcomes and agents’
welfare given the information available to the policy maker. Many existing incentive payments
schemes, particularly those in developing countries, either have a singular focus on environmen-
tal gains or combine this with social or development-led objectives. An example of the former was
observed in Los Negros, Bolivia. Facilitated by a local biodiversity NGO and ﬁnanced by a interna-
tional conservation agency, compensation to local people was made on a quid-pro-quo basis for
protecting biodiversity (Asquith et al., 2008). In addition to environmental objectives, social equity
and developmental issues were a key motivation for implementing the Mexican program of pay-
ments for Hydrological Environmental Services of Forests (PSAH) Mun˜oz-Pin˜a et al., 2008. Commonly
known as ‘co-beneﬁts’, biodiversity conservation, good governance and improvements in livelihoods
are increasingly being incorporated into REDD payments schemes (UNREDD, 2009; Brown et al., 2008;
Simonet et al., 2012). For example, the N’hambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique pro-
moted carbon sequestration activities alongside improvements in livelihoods (Groom and Palmer,
2012). Although that project did not seek to proﬁt from the sale of carbon offsets, private ﬁrms have
established numerous forest carbon projects in developing countries (Bayon et al., 2012; Taiyab, 2006).
The policy maker in our framework has one of the three objectives outlined above. It knows the dis-
tribution of Business-As-Usual (BAU) levels of deforestation among agents and the distribution of their
opportunity costs. Under asymmetric information it cannot infer individual costs. We  then explore
1 Wunder (2005) deﬁnes PES as a voluntary transaction between at least one buyer and at least one seller in which payments
are  conditional on maintaining an ecosystem use that provides well-deﬁned environmental services.
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trade-offs between improvements in agents’ welfare and increases in the supply of avoided deforesta-
tion beneﬁts from REDD when the policy maker has full information on agents’ opportunity costs. A
uniform baseline from which payments are made is assumed along with a constant budget size. Yet,
policy objectives such as poverty alleviation or environmental improvements can also be achieved
through changes in baseline levels and budget constraints. This was shown by Horan and Claassen
(2007), who explored the relationship between the efﬁciency and distributional consequences of pay-
ments schemes with limited budgets. Different policy objectives were also a key feature of Wu et al.’s
(2001) model of a conservation fund under full information. Although not explicitly considered in our
framework, they show how the output price reduces environmental gains from the fund. The extent
of change is, at least in part, determined by the targeting strategy adopted by the fund.
Since agricultural households, logging companies, and agri-businesses obtain diverse beneﬁts from
deforesting, they can have very different opportunity costs from not deforesting. Thus, some agents can
provide environmental services at lower cost than others. Moreover, agents are likely to have better
information about the size of these costs than the policy maker. This type of information asymmetry,
known as hidden information, can lead to inefﬁciencies in payments schemes. If the payments exceed
agents’ opportunity costs then uniform contracts may  be a costly way of inducing agents to participate.
Yet such payments also have the potential to improve the welfare of scheme participants.
For the purposes of this paper, payments are made to agents when the policy maker either has
asymmetric or full information on the opportunity costs of the former. We  acknowledge, however,
that reality most likely lies between these two settings. To prevent informational rents accruing to
low-cost agents, separating contracts can be used to separate the low- from the high-cost agents.2
While offering a menu of contracts may  be more efﬁcient than a uniform contract, they are rarely
used in practice (Ferraro, 2008).3 Informational requirements on the part of the policy maker may  be
substantial and the menu of contracts that would be offered in the presence of complete information
may  not be incentive compatible in the presence of information asymmetries (Arguedas and Soest,
2011). Instead of offering a menu of contracts, procurement auctions have been proposed and used in
practice as a means of extracting informational rents from agents (e.g. Stoneham et al., 2003; Jack et al.,
2009). Note also that while, for example, ‘ﬁrst rejected bid sets the price’ auctions may  be incentive
compatible, incentive compatibility may  nevertheless depend on allowing low-cost agents some rent,
i.e. not all rents may  be extracted. Thus, improving information on agents’ opportunity costs is possible,
although debate continues about the relative efﬁciency of separating contracts vis-a-vis auctions.
We introduce the model, beginning with the asymmetric information setting, in Section 2. The
three types of policy maker set the same level of REDD payment resulting in the same environmental
outcome. Section 3 presents the setting in which policy makers have full information about agents’
opportunity costs. Both the welfare and avoided deforestation outcomes depend on the policy maker’s
objective. If maximizing income from REDD, having full information allows the policy maker to bind
agents to their opportunity costs. It is then able to capture the surplus rents. Thus, the well-being of
agents is reduced but with no change in the amount of avoided deforestation relative to the asymmet-
ric information setting. With an environmental objective, improving information improves scheme
effectiveness in terms of avoided deforestation. Less money is spent on agents with low opportunity
costs and more is allocated to those with higher costs, i.e. agents lose the rents associated with asym-
metric information. In this case, improving information increases the outcome in terms of avoided
deforestation but leaves agents with no net welfare gain. When the main aim is poverty alleviation,
improving information will have no impact on the overall welfare outcome as rents stay with agents.
Under reasonable assumptions, outcomes may  also remain unchanged under full information. More
generally, the distribution of rents across agents may  depend on the policy maker’s preferences, result-
ing in avoided deforestation outcomes that are at least as high as under asymmetric information but
always below the outcome when the main aim is reducing deforestation.
2 For classic examples of separating contracts as applied to agri-environmental schemes, see Smith (1995) and Wu and
Babcock (1995, 1996).
3 Payments have, however, been reported to be differentiated according to scheme-speciﬁc criteria such as agro-ecological
zones in order to meet environmental objectives (Wunder et al., 2008). Schemes in both Bolivia and Ecuador, for example,
offered payments, which were differentiated according to the types of forest held by landowners and farmers.
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These results are illustrated with data collected on households’ opportunity costs in the Brazil-
ian state of Amazonas, in Section 4. Land use is characterized by low productivity agriculture on land
made available through the conversion of forest of high carbon content. Under a hypothetical REDD
payments scheme, and with full information on opportunity costs, a policy maker with an environ-
mental objective is able to enrol almost all of the forest in the area. Less forest is enroled by a policy
maker with either of the other two  policy objectives. The data could allow for second-order discrimi-
nation among potential scheme participants. However, relatively little variation in opportunity costs is
observed among most agents in our sample thus implying few informational rents. Section 5 discusses
the results along with their policy implications before concluding.
2. Payments for reducing deforestation under asymmetric information
In this section, we present an incentive payments scheme for reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion when there is asymmetric information on deforestation agents’ opportunity costs of avoiding
deforestation. We  ﬁrst present the deforestation agents and the Business-As-Usual (BAU) deforesta-
tion baseline before moving to the payments scheme. As in Leplay et al. (2011), several types of policy
maker objectives are considered and the equilibrium payments policy is inferred.
2.1. Deforestation agents and Business-As-Usual scenario
We  consider a potential REDD host country in which deforestation agents, e.g. agricultural house-
holds, logging ﬁrms, i ∈ [0, N], are distributed according to f(i). The deforestation agents obtain some
private beneﬁt (or net income) Yi ∈ [Y, Y] from deforestation Di ∈ [D, D].
In our model, Di is the individual deforestation level of agent i, and DBAU =
∫ N
0
Dif (i)di is the total
level of deforestation in a BAU scenario. Moreover, agent i obtains private beneﬁts Yi from deforestation
Di, which are assumed to be known by the agent. Total beneﬁts from deforestation are given by YBAU =∫ N
0
Yif (i)di in a BAU scenario, which can also be interpreted as an aggregate measure of deforestation
agents’ welfare.
We assume that the policy maker has information on the distribution of deforestation levels and
agents’ opportunity costs, and also on individual agents’ deforestation levels. The information asym-
metry thus only holds on individual opportunity costs. We  justify this assumption on the basis of there
typically being wide variation in Yi for a given Di across agents. In other words, individual agents have
private information regarding the proﬁtability of their deforestation activities, which will depend on,
for example, their labor endowments, social capital and degree of market access.4
2.2. Introducing payments for reducing emissions from deforestation
The policy maker in the REDD host country establishes an incentive payments or PES scheme
to reduce emissions from deforestation. In response to the information asymmetry, it offers ﬁxed,
uniform payments per hectare as an incentive to avoid deforestation against the BAU base-
line.
Any agent i may  accept or refuse the offer. If it accepts, agent i reduces its deforestation from Di,
the payment baseline, to DPES
i
. For simplicity, we  assume that DPES
i
= 0. In this sense, we  consider
DBAU as the quantity of deforestation that is avoided, or similarly, we  assume zero variation in the
opportunity costs of individual agents, i.e. across their land holdings. We  assume perfect monitoring of
deforestation levels under the payments scheme, for example, using a combination of remote sensing
data and ground surveys. This could form part of the monitoring, measurement and veriﬁcation (MRV)
procedures established in the REDD host country. Such monitoring thus precludes problems of moral
hazard and contract compliance on the part of agents. In exchange for avoiding deforestation the agent
4 However, our qualitative results also hold when individual deforestation levels are not known by the policy maker, if
individual levels of deforestation are positively related to opportunity costs. The only difference is that the uniform payment is
not  made per hectare of avoided deforestation but as a ﬁxed amount.
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receives a ﬁxed payment per hectare p. If it declines participation in the scheme, agent i continues to
receive its BAU income Yi. Agent i accepts the offer if and only if it makes it better off: pDi ≥ Yi.
In our framework, third-party ﬁnance for REDD can be accessed by the policy maker based on the
REDD host country. Since payments for avoided deforestation are made conditional on the provision
of the forest carbon service, we assume secure land tenure and well-deﬁned property rights. Although
these conditions are fundamental to the effectiveness of REDD, we note that tenure reform has been
lagging in the majority of REDD-eligible countries (Sunderlin et al., 2009). There are two  options for
channeling REDD ﬁnance. First, veriﬁable avoided deforestation could create carbon (offset) credits,
which can then be sold on an international carbon market at price r. Alternatively, the policy maker
could be retributed through an international REDD fund established by developed countries. In this
case, r would represent the price offered by the fund in exchange for a given, veriﬁed amount of
avoided deforestation.
2.3. The policy maker
In our framework, the indifferent agent ı˜  is the one who separates the total population, and is
deﬁned as: Y˜ = pD˜. Agents with a low opportunity cost (i ∈ [0, ı˜])  participate in the scheme while
agents with a high opportunity cost (i ∈ [ı˜, N]) choose to stay out.
Total agent income, total deforestation levels under the payments scheme, avoided deforestation
and the cost of the payments scheme are given by:
YPES =
∫ N
ı˜
Yif (i)di +
∫ ı˜
0
pDif (i)di (1)
DPES =
∫ N
ı˜
Dif (i)di (2)
AD = DBAU − DPES =
∫ ı˜
0
Dif (i)di (3)
C =
∫ ı˜
0
pDif (i)di (4)
Under asymmetric information, the policy maker only has to set the amount of the payment p,
which determines the indifferent agent and the number of agents entering the scheme i ∈ [0, ı˜].  It
cannot discriminate among deforestation agents, and therefore cannot capture the surplus rents from
the REDD scheme. Participants are assumed to comply and deliver the beneﬁts associated with their
REDD contracts. As noted previously, there is perfect and costless monitoring of REDD contracts.
The policy maker has one of the three types of objectives. First, we  consider a policy maker that aims
to maximize net income from REDD, before considering one aiming to maximize the size of the forest
of the area to be protected under REDD. Finally, the policy maker has a poverty alleviation objective
that aims to maximize the welfare of agents participating in the REDD scheme.
2.3.1. Policy maker aiming to maximize net income
As described in Section 1, the objective of maximizing net income from REDD can be interpreted
in different ways. First, it may  characterize the proﬁt-driven objectives of private sector intermedi-
aries and project developers, which establish forest carbon projects in response to the demand for
voluntary offsets. Second, it could be a government that prefers to increase social welfare by utiliz-
ing the income obtained from REDD rather than distributing it to deforestation agents. Thus, income
from REDD could be used to fund public services such as education, health, and infrastructure, or
could be distributed to the population at large. The latter could apply in a situation where the social
cost of public funds is small enough, i.e. implying that the policy maker can improve social welfare
using REDD ﬁnance for public services rather than directly distributing it to agents. Third, it could
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be a corrupt government that distributes income to rent-seeking groups through its client-patron
networks.5
The maximization program of the policy maker is:
max
p
PM = rAD − C (5)
2.3.2. Policy maker aiming to maximize the environmental impact
In our second case, the policy maker has the objective of maximizing the quantity of avoided
deforestation. Its program is:
max
p
AD = DBAU − DPES (6)
s.t. rAD − C≥0
2.3.3. Policy maker aiming to alleviate poverty
The last type of policy objective only focuses on the welfare of deforestation agents. The policy
maker thus implements its payments scheme such that the welfare of deforestation agents is max-
imized compared to the BAU baseline subject to a budget constraint, i.e. it cannot make a loss from
implementing the scheme:
max
p
WA = YPES − YBAU (7)
s.t. rAD − C≥0
2.3.4. Summarizing the solution across objectives
In all three cases, asymmetric information implies that the policy maker implements the same
payment level across agents. Indeed, since the policy maker cannot discriminate among deforesta-
tion agents, the surplus from REDD remains with the agents. Asymmetric information about agents’
opportunity costs prevents the policy maker from being able to redistribute the surplus from REDD.
Note that agents are better off under asymmetric information, i.e. they beneﬁt from holding pri-
vate information about their opportunity costs, which increases their welfare relative to the BAU
baseline.
The equilibrium payments scheme thus takes the form:{
p = r ∀i ∈ [0,  N]
ı˜ :
Y˜
D˜
= r
(8)
Fig. 16 presents the outcomes of payments made for the three policy objectives under asymmetric
information. Fig. 1i presents the distribution of average opportunity costs Yi/Di; Fig. 1ii presents the
distribution of opportunity costs Yi; Fig. 1iii presents the distribution of deforestation levels Di. Due to
asymmetric information about individual opportunity costs, the policy maker sets the same payment
level irrespective of its objective. A uniform payment is implemented and deforestation agents decide
whether or not to enter into the scheme.
The policy maker sets p = r (Fig. 1i), with the indifferent agent represented by Y˜B,P,E/D˜B,P,E = r.
Deforestation agents increase their welfare relative to the BAU baseline by the amount shown in zone
1 in Fig. 1ii. While they receive pDi for not deforesting, they generate Yi < pDi for deforesting. The
amount of deforestation avoided is shown in zone 2 of Fig. 1iii. Finally, the REDD payments scheme
5 Therefore, we do not consider explicitly how the net income from REDD is used, whether it is in a positive (public services)
or  negative (rent-seeking) way.
6 To simplify the presentation of the ﬁgures, we  implicitly assume here that agents with low opportunity costs also have low
levels  of deforestation.
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Fig. 1. Payments scheme for REDD under asymmetric information.
binds the budget constraint since the payment pD˜B,P,E is sold at rD˜B,P,E to the carbon buyer participating
either in the international carbon market or the REDD fund.
3. The impact of making payments under full information
In this section, we consider the impact of payments on deforestation avoided and agents’ welfare
when the policy maker has full information about agents’ opportunity costs. Since full information
is the polar opposite of asymmetric information, reality will most likely be a case of improved
information. Such improved information may  be derived from procurement auctions of conservation
P. Delacote et al. / Resource and Energy Economics 36 (2014) 508–527 515
contracts in the targeted areas. This is provided they are designed to be incentive compatible
thus prompting agents to reveal their true opportunity costs. Alternatively, screening contracts
could be used to reduce the capture of informational rents by landowners. Yet, we note that these
require knowledge of landowner types and therefore may  be costly for policy makers to implement
(see Ferraro, 2008). Finally, information may  be derived from household income surveys linking
deforestation income to agent observables, as illustrated for the case of Amazonas state, in Section 4.
As a result, the policy maker can infer information about agents and payments may  be implemented
in a more ﬂexible way. More precisely, the policy maker is able to discriminate agents according to
their opportunity costs. The payment now consists of an agent speciﬁc price pi to the deforestation
agent i per hectare of avoided deforestation. The indifferent agent ˜˜ı is the one who  separates the total
population, and is deﬁned as: ˜˜Y = ˜˜p ˜˜D. Agents with a low opportunity cost (i ∈ [0, ˜˜i])  participate in the
scheme while agents with a high one (i ∈ [˜˜i, N]) opt out. The only difference, compared to the previous
model, is that p becomes pi in Eqs. (1) and (4).
When setting the price schedule pi of the scheme, the policy maker has to make two choices. First,
it chooses the indifferent agent ˜˜ı,  i.e. the ﬁnal or last agent to participate in the scheme, setting p˜˜ı.
Second, it decides how much to pay agents entering the scheme, setting pi for agents i ∈ [0, ˜˜ı].
The choice of the indifferent agent determines the quantity of avoided deforestation, AD. The price
level determines how the surplus from REDD is distributed between the policy maker and defor-
estation agents. Setting pi = Yi/Di implies that agents are retributed according to their opportunity
costs, which means that the surplus from REDD is entirely captured by the policy maker. In other
words, agents’ welfare remains as in the BAU baseline case. Setting pi > Yi/Di implies that some share
of the REDD surplus is distributed to deforestation agents. Thus, they are better off under the scheme
compared to the BAU baseline case.
3.1. Policy maker aiming to maximize net income
The policy maker aiming to maximize net income will pay deforestation agents so long as it makes
proﬁt on the scheme. Note that the price offered must remain lower than the international price r.
Moreover, it will pay them as little as possible. In the context of improved information about agents’
opportunity costs, this means that it will bind them to these costs.
The equilibrium scheme is thus:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi =
⎧⎨
⎩
Yi
Di
∀i ∈ [0, ˜˜ı]
r∀i ∈ [˜˜ı, N]
˜˜ı :
˜˜Y
˜˜D
= r
∫ ˜˜ı
0
(r − pi)Dif (i)di > 0
(9)
Compared to the asymmetric information setting, the policy maker with full information can bind
agents to their opportunity costs, which implies a different distribution of the surplus from REDD.
Deforestation agents’ welfare is then exactly the same as in the BAU baseline and lower than that
found under asymmetric information.
3.2. Policy maker aiming to maximize the environmental impact
In contrast to the previous policy objective, the policy maker with an environmental aim could
potentially offer a price higher than the international carbon price to some agents. Indeed, it prefers
to make some proﬁt on agents with a low opportunity cost by paying them a price lower than the
international price. This proﬁt can then be used to give incentives to agents with a high opportunity
cost. The policy maker thus binds agents to their opportunity costs.
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Overall, the equilibrium payments scheme takes the form:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi =
⎧⎨
⎩
Yi
Di
∀i ∈ [0, ˜˜ı]
r  ∀i ∈ [˜˜ı, N]
˜˜ı :
∫ ˜˜ı
0
(r − pi)Dif (i)di = 0
(10)
In this case, making a proﬁt on some deforestation agents enables the policy maker to pay agents
with opportunity costs more than the international carbon price. Thus, the quantity of avoided defor-
estation is higher than the quantity achieved with the income-maximizing policy maker. Deforestation
agents’ welfare, however, is the same as in the BAU case and strictly lower than under asymmetric
information.
3.3. Policy maker aiming to alleviate poverty
Where the policy maker aims at maximizing the welfare of agents involved in the REDD scheme, its
preference is to allow the agents to keep the REDD budget provided the budget constraint is binding.
However, the distribution of the rent can take any form, depending on the policy maker’s preferences.
That is, it depends on the relative weight placed on respective agents’ rent gains.
To illustrate, we assume that the policy maker prefers to follow Rawls’ criterion (1971). Thus, it
maximizes the welfare of the least-favored deforestation agent ex post, i.e. after the REDD payment
has been made. In this case, provided the agents’ opportunity costs Yi/Di exactly reﬂect the relevant
welfare ordering, there is a unique solution to Eq. (7). Indeed, a uniform payment to participating
agents is required by the maximin objective, where r is the maximum amount of money the policy
maker can give to every agent involved without making a loss. Therefore, so long as the offered price
pi is strictly larger than agent i’s opportunity cost, i will be better off under the scheme.
The equilibrium payments scheme thus takes the form:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi = r ∀i ∈ [0,  N]
˜˜ı :
˜˜Y
˜˜D
= r
∫ ˜˜ı
0
(r − pi)Dif (i)di = 0
(11)
The policy maker sets a uniform price to all agents, which is similar to that set under asymmetric
information. Low opportunity cost agents accept the payment, which improves their well being. They
lose Yi but get rDi > Yi. The policy maker then sells the avoided deforestation credits at the same price
r, and is thus able to ﬁnance the policy without loss. Note here that agents with a high opportunity
cost obtain the same welfare as in the BAU baseline.
It can be seen that under these assumptions, the indifferent agent is the same as found under
asymmetric information. The outcome in terms of avoided deforestation is also the same, as is the
adoption of a uniform payment or price to avoid deforestation. Thus, when the policy maker opts to
alleviate poverty through the adoption of the Rawlsian maximin criterion, pi = r. Under full information,
both agents’ welfare and the quantity of avoided deforestation are identical to the outcomes achieved
under asymmetric information. Improving information about agents’ true opportunity costs therefore
has no real impact on either outcome.
However, there may  be other ways of distributing the rent if we  relax the assumption of ordering
according to Yi/Di. In this case, the implemented REDD scheme would depend on an explicit model of
distribution that has to be speciﬁed. In other words, what weight is given by the policy maker to agents
with a low opportunity cost? Fig. 2 shows that depending on the preferred transfer proﬁle, one could
use the budget to offer non-uniform payments to agents. The red and green dashed lines represent
two possibilities for distribution of the rent to agents. This could result in a continuum of avoided
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Fig. 2. Different transfer proﬁles for the policy maker aiming to alleviate poverty.
deforestation amounts as well. The budget constraint will be fulﬁlled provided A above r equals A
below r, likewise for the B areas.
By implication, the policy maker with a poverty alleviation objective will always have aggregate
output equal to or above that of the income maximizer and below or equal to that of one focused on the
environment. It will never have aggregate D below the income maximizer because that would mean
forgoing additional funds to enhance agents’ welfare, which runs counter to its poverty alleviation
objective. Further, it cannot set a price resulting in an aggregate level of avoided deforestation higher
than that of the environmental policy maker since that would mean not making any agent better
off at all. This is also counter to the poverty alleviation objective. Regardless of the aggregate D, the
aggregate welfare gain can never rise above that of the case where pi = r for all i, because the aggregate
surplus to be distributed is maximized at this level.
In sum, the outcomes of these many possible pi schemes are: (i) the agents obtain the same total
welfare gain in all cases; (ii) the forest secured would be equal to or larger than the amount of forest
secured under income-maximization but never larger than the area secured under the environmental
policy objective. Finally, the use of the uniform payment pi = r as the method of transferring rents
and improving welfare may  also be preferable for practical and cost reasons. Payments schemes in
practice rarely implement price discrimination based solely on criteria related to poverty such as the
ones described above. Instead, most targeting is based on ratios of beneﬁts, risks and/or costs, even in
schemes that incorporate equity co-beneﬁts as an additional objective (e.g. Mun˜oz-Pin˜a et al., 2008).
Proposition 1. When implementing a payments scheme with the option of selling the beneﬁts from
avoided deforestation to a REDD fund or international carbon market and with full information about
agents’ opportunity costs and deforestation levels, the policy maker aiming to maximize its income obtains
the lowest level of avoided deforestation while the policy maker aiming to maximize the amount of
deforestation avoided achieves the highest level. The policy maker pursuing poverty alleviation in the
REDD-affected community will obtain at least the same REDD outcome as the income-maximizing policy
maker, and never more than the environmental policy maker. Regarding welfare, the policy maker aiming
to alleviate poverty increases deforestation agents’ welfare with payments while the income-maximizing
and environmental policy makers bind deforestation agents to their opportunity costs, which prevents them
from being better off under REDD.
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Table 1
Outcomes under full information.
Indifferent agent, ı˜ Agents’ welfare,
WA
REDD net
income, PM
Avoided
deforestation, AD
Poverty alleviation ˜˜ıBP 1 0 3
Income maximization ˜˜ıBP 0 1 3
Environment ˜˜ıE 0 1 − 2 =0 3 + 4
Proposition 2. In comparison to the asymmetric information scenario, when improving information
about individual opportunity costs:
• Under a income-maximization objective, the policy maker can proﬁt from low opportunity cost agents,
which results in the same avoided deforestation outcome while the surplus from REDD is switched from
the deforestation agents to the policy maker.
• Under an environmental objective, the policy maker redistributes REDD rent from low opportunity cost
agents to agents with higher opportunity costs; the amount of deforestation avoided is larger while the
welfare of deforestation agents decreases.
• Under a poverty alleviation objective, the policy maker could implement an inﬁnity of schemes depending
on its preferred transfer proﬁle. When it applies Rawls? criterion, it sets the same level of payment. This
results in the same outcome both in terms of avoided deforestation and welfare. When not applying
Rawls, other solutions for pi imply that the aggregate welfare for agents remains the same as with no
information but the distribution changes. The REDD outcome, however, will be intermediate compared
to the outcome under the other two policy objectives.
3.4. Graphic illustration
Table 1 and Fig. 3 illustrate the payments schemes and associated outcomes for the three pol-
icy objectives under full information. Similar to Fig. 1, Fig. 3i presents the distribution of average
opportunity costs Yi/Di; Fig. 3ii, the distribution of opportunity costs Yi; Fig. 3iii, the distribution of
deforestation levels Di.
The policy maker can now discriminate among deforestation agents. Under an income-
maximization objective, the policy maker sets pi = Yi/Di, up to pi = r (Fig. 3i). As a consequence, the
indifferent agent remains ˜˜ıB,P , although the agents’ welfare is the same as under BAU. Avoided defor-
estation is still equal to zone 3, in Fig. 3iii. However, the scheme makes some proﬁt as illustrated in
zone 1 (Fig. 3ii). The policy maker buys avoided deforestation at price Yi/Di and sells the credit at price
r > Yi/Di.
Under an environmental objective, the policy maker also makes some proﬁt on low opportunity
cost agents (zone 1 in Fig. 3ii). This proﬁt is redistributed to agents with higher opportunity costs.
The indifferent agent here is ˜˜ıE such that the area in zone 1 equals the area in zone 2 (Fig. 3ii), that
is the scheme makes no proﬁt. A larger number of indifferent agents increase the amount of avoided
deforestation equivalent to both zone 3 + 4 (Fig. 3iii).
Finally, under a poverty alleviation objective, the policy maker following the Rawlsian criterion
sets pi = r for all agents (Fig. 3i). As a result, the indifferent agent is ˜˜ıB,P . Their welfare increases by
the amount given in zone 1 (Fig. 3ii). This is the difference between the amount received under the
scheme and the amount received in the BAU baseline (rDi − Yi). The amount of deforestation avoided
is illustrated in zone 3, in Fig. 3iii. The scheme breaks even since the amount spent (pi
˜˜DB,P) equals the
amount received from international REDD ﬁnance (rAD), as shown in zone 1 (Fig. 3ii). Note that other
avoided deforestation outcomes are possible for the policy maker with a poverty focus, although these
are bounded by those of the other policy objectives.
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Fig. 3. Payment scheme and avoided deforestation under full information.
4. Model simulations using Brazilian data
4.1. Case study presentation
Brazil is a priority for REDD activities. The country hosts two-thirds of the world’s largest forest,
the Amazon biome, which covers 6.4 million square kilometers. This contains the equivalent of 15
years of current annual worldwide anthropogenic emissions (Soares-Filho et al., 2006; May  et al.,
2011). Absolute deforestation rates in Brazil are also among the highest in the world, representing
approximately one-ﬁfth of global CO2 emissions from land-use change (Börner et al., 2010). In recent
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Fig. 4. Forest vegetation and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 2001.
Source:  http://www.globalforestwatch.org. The baseline for the Human Pressure analysis was a dataset that combines vegetation
(IBGE, 1997) and deforestation as of 2001 (INPE 2003).
decades, frontier expansion has occurred along the ‘Arc of Deforestation’, which stretches from the
northeast of the states of Para, Tocantins, Maranhão, down to Mato Grosso and west to Rondônia,
ending in the state of Acre (Fig. 4). New frontiers have recently begun to emerge, including the southern
border of Amazonas state (May  et al., 2011).
The state of Amazonas is one of the 10 states comprising the Legal Amazon (Amazonia Legal),
covering 61 percent of the country. Households in all areas not designated as reserves are bound by
the Brazilian Forest Code, which, during the study period, required at least 80 percent of their land to be
under forest cover. Surveyed households were randomly chosen from a selection of villages both inside
and outside two state-level protected areas or reserves, Uatumã and Juma. The simulations utilized
data collected from 96 households outside the two reserves (50 outside Uatumã and 46 outside Juma),
and not those surveyed inside the reserves. This is to avoid confounding the simulation results through
the use of data from households who were already receiving incentive payments for conservation and
were subject to tighter restrictions on land use inside the reserves.
4.2. Estimation of opportunity costs and BAU deforestation
Opportunity costs are estimated from the household survey, which included information on house-
hold income earned and assets held in the year prior to the survey. Socio-demographic data such as
household composition, age, and education were collected as well as data on land clearing, extraction
behavior and household well-being. The average shares of annual income by source at the aggregate,
sample level are shown in Table 2. They highlight the general importance of livestock and agricultural
incomes to households in the study areas.
Outside Juma, the predominant income source and land-use activity is livestock (mainly cattle)
while agriculture (cassava and fruits) dominates outside Uatumã. Opportunity costs per hectare of
forest land are ﬁrst calculated using agriculture and livestock income at the household level since
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Table 2
Average annual income shares for sampled households outside the reserves.
Non natural resource-based income Natural resource-based income
Extractive Land use
Total income shares Business Salary Other Forest Net agriculture Net livestock
Outside Juma 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.29
Outside Uatumã 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.33 0.11
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for households outside the reserves.
N Mean S.D. Min
Net productivitya (BRL/ha)
Low estimate 91 1396.10 2229.88 -289
Net  agricultural income (BRL) 85 5950.66 9739.77 −4800
Net  livestock and animal product income (BRL) 76 4996.94 13659.78 −13167
Land  use over past 4 years (ha) 96 29.52 65.76 0
Total  cropland (ha) 92 2.25 3.35 0
Total  pasture (ha) 92 23.93 56.59 0
Early  fallow (ha) 92 4.61 13.45 0
a Net productivity is deﬁned as: agricultural livestock/animal income per hectare of cropland + pasture + early fallow.
they are the primary land uses after forest is cleared in the area (SDS et al., 2010). This is then divided
by the sum of land currently under cropland or pasture as well as early fallow in order to obtain Yi/Di.
However, while all of this area is in production it does not correspond to a single year of defor-
estation behavior at the household level. To account for the periodicity of agriculture, we  estimated
an annual land clearance ﬁgure (Di) by dividing the sum of cropland, pasture and early fallow by ten
years. According to Vosti et al. (2002), agricultural production (annual crops) in the Amazon is gen-
erally viable for two years after which ﬁelds are left to fallow for around three years before ﬁelds are
planted again. Alternatively, ﬁelds can be converted to pasture, which are viable for 15 years. In our
measure of net agricultural and livestock productivity per hectare on current land in production and
recently fallowed land, we assume a static income ﬂow and ignore the diminishing returns to land
over time as a result of decreasing soil and land productivity.
The aggregate productivity of 1 ha was estimated for each household by dividing the net income
derived from agriculture and livestock and animal product sources by the total land dedicated to each
of these activities (cropland, pasture and early fallow).
Summary statistics of net productivity in Brazilian Reais (BRL) are presented in Table 3, showing
the value per hectare of cropland, pasture and early fallow.7 Mean incomes are also provided in BRL.
These also vary widely among individual households. Due to the difﬁculties in getting respondents
to discriminate between inputs and investment, a snap-shot measurement like this will have some
households report negative incomes, e.g. as a result of one-off, substantial purchases of inputs, or
investments. The mean area under cropland is much smaller than the area under pasture. Thus, income
per hectare is on average much higher for agriculture than for livestock, the latter being an extensive
but land-intensive activity.
4.3. Setting a carbon payment level
In order to generate a feasible international payment for avoiding deforestation (r), several factors
need to be considered. First, a carbon price has to be determined. Assuming that REDD markets are
7 One household claimed a total area of land, which seemed unreasonably small for the amount of agricultural production, and
is  therefore excluded from the sample. Another four households who either had no recorded agricultural or livestock income,
or  recorded land were also excluded.
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Table 4
Discount rate and corresponding payments.
Discount rate,  5% 10% 15%
Price  of permanent CER, D /tCO2 10 10 10
Price  of 5-year non-permanent tCER, D /tCO2 2.16 3.79 5.03
Annual payment, D /tCO2 0.48 0.95 1.43
Annual payment, BRL/tCO2 1.10 2.19 3.29
Annual payment, BRL/ha = r 442 883 1325
based on the sale of temporary credits (Börner and Wunder, 2008), we  opted to use the crediting
structure as adopted by afforestation and reforestation projects in the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). These projects allocate temporary Certiﬁed Emissions Reductions (tCERs), which typically fetch
a price lower than that of permanent CERs. A conservative estimate of 10 D /tCO2 for permanent CERs
is used. Second, a discount rate is chosen that will affect the value of tCERs against permanent CERs.
We opted to vary the discount rate between 5 and 15 percent, as seen in Table 3. This range is chosen
in order to show the sensitivity of the simulation results to changes in the tCER price. Given the higher
risks a carbon market may  associate with carbon credits from REDD compared to other mitigation
options, the lower bound is set relatively high at ﬁve percent. The relationship between the price of a
tCER, PtCER0 , and that of a permanent CER, P
CER
0 , is given by (see Dutschke et al., 2004):
PtCER0 = PCER0 −
PCERT
(1 + )T
(12)
where  is the discount rate and T = 5. We  convert this price into the corresponding annuity over the
ﬁve years before applying it to the eligible amount of CO2 per hectare (see below and Table 4). This
enables a comparison with our estimates of annual per hectare opportunity costs.
Carbon content per hectare varies widely in the Amazon. We  apply a conservative estimate of
110 Mg  C/ha, corresponding to 403 tCO2/ha (Houghton, 2001). In the calculations shown below, we
present payments for net carbon stock, of around 81.5 t C/ha (equivalent to around 75% of gross
stocking per ha).8
4.4. Simulation results
Fig. 5 identiﬁes the total and marginal hectare purchased under the REDD payments scheme, at
each level of r and for the alternative cost estimations. The x-axis shows the distribution of land, which
is ordered by households’ increasing opportunity cost per hectare deforested. The y-axis shows the
price r and the annual opportunity cost per hectare. High-cost hectares were truncated in this ﬁgure
as they are very few and very expensive. Nonetheless, they are included in the simulations since they
are representative of projected land pressures in the area. Irrespective of discount rate used, REDD
payments could, in principle, induce the participation of the majority of sampled households. This
reﬂects the relatively large but also extensively managed livestock land holdings, the generally low
productivity of agricultural and livestock production, and the high carbon content of the Amazon.
Table 5 outlines the measures of agents’ welfare (WA), REDD net income (PM) and hectares of
avoided deforestation (AD). First, under asymmetric information the amount of avoided deforestation
is identical across all policy objectives. Irrespective of objective, the policy maker would not buy up
all the hectares in this sample of households. With full information, it is neither optimal nor budget
compatible for the policy maker with the income maximization objective to buy out all the hectares,
even at differing tCER prices. The result is similar for the policy maker pursuing poverty alleviation
using a uniform price. It is only optimal for the policy maker with the environmental objective to buy
out almost all hectares in our sample at the tCER price with a 5% discount rate and all hectares at
the higher rates. The effect of increased information on opportunity costs is to shift rents from agents
8 The carbon content of 110 Mg  C (t)/ha includes the carbon content of secondary regrowth based on Fearnside’s (1996)
average biomass ﬁgure of 28.5 t C per hectare for all deforested areas in the Amazon.
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Fig. 5.
Table 5
Distribution of rents across government and households and the area contracted.
Information state Policy maker  tCER cost Agents’ total welfare gain REDD net income
∑
Di
BRL/ha WA , BRL/year PM , BRL/year AD, ha
Informed
Poverty
focus
5% 331 58,469 0 218.8
10%  663 137,231 0 240.2
15%  994 222,239 0 255.8
Income-
maximizing
5%  331 0 58,469 218.8
10%  663 0 137,231 240.2
15%  994 0 222,239 255.8
Environmental
focus
5%  331 0 0 277.8
10%  663 0 0 283.4 (all area)
15% 994 0 0 283.4 (all area)
Uninformed
Across 5% 331 58,469 0 218.8
all  10% 663 137,231 0 240.2
objectives 15% 994 222,239 0 255.8
to the income maximizing policy maker, and from low- to high-cost agents when maximizing the
environmental impact of REDD in the area. Both agents’ welfare and the amount of hectares enrolled
in the REDD scheme remain unchanged when poverty alleviation is the policy focus.
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we develop a simple incentive payments framework for investigating the impacts of
improving information about agents’ opportunity costs on agents’ welfare and the amount of defor-
estation avoided under differing policy objectives. With growing interest from policy makers and
practitioners in policies for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), we focus
on the claim that improving information could lead to increased efﬁciency. First, an incentive payment
is offered by a policy maker in a REDD host country conditional on deforestation agents not deforest-
ing. Second, the carbon services supplied from avoided deforestation may  be sold by the host country
either on an international carbon market (in the form of carbon credits) or to a fund, at a ﬁxed price.
We consider two settings: asymmetric and full information about individual agents’ opportunity costs
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and their deforestation levels. In both, the distribution of opportunity costs and BAU deforestation are
known to the policy maker.
Reducing the informational setting to two extremes is, we acknowledge, a likely over-simpliﬁcation
of reality in most cases. Yet, we found this to be the clearest way  of demonstrating how improved infor-
mation might inﬂuence the environmental and distributional impacts of REDD payments. It also allows
us to explore how these impacts vary depending on the objective of the policy maker implementing the
payments scheme. We  examine three different objectives: maximizing income, maximizing avoided
deforestation, and poverty alleviation. The last focuses on the welfare of those directly affected by the
scheme.
If the policy maker is income maximizing, improving information about individual opportunity
costs enables it to capture the surplus from REDD. This leaves agents at their BAU income levels without
increasing the amount of avoided deforestation. Improving information increases the quantity of forest
conserved only if the policy maker aims to maximize avoided deforestation within the targeted area.
As illustrated with the simulations performed using household data collected in Brazil, it uses the
information on opportunity costs to generate proﬁt on low-cost agents thus paying them less than
the international price. This proﬁt is then used to retribute agents with larger opportunity costs.
We note, however, that by paying these agents more than the international price such payments
could be construed as inefﬁcient. Yet the net effect aggregated across all deforestation agents is more
deforestation avoided for a given price. It also leaves agents at their BAU income levels.
For the policy maker pursuing the objective of poverty alleviation among agents enrolled in the
REDD scheme, improving information may  have no real environmental impact. This is particularly
likely to be the case should the policy maker decide to adopt a uniform payment in order to transfer
rents to agents. Of the three policy objectives, poverty alleviation has the greatest impact in terms of
welfare improvements for the rural poor. In this case, the policy maker pays as much as possible to
the agents. Irrespective of whether it sets a uniform or non-uniform price across agents, all income
is distributed among agents. The amount of deforestation avoided will be at least the same as for the
income-maximizing policy maker. Greater amounts are possible if transfers to higher-cost agents are
given sufﬁcient weight. Given the demands of stakeholders in the REDD policy debate to improve the
well being of (often poor) forest dwellers, these are important insights.
We  acknowledge that our typology of policy makers simpliﬁes often complex decision-making
processes. Such processes remain essentially unobservable to international sources. Yet important
differences in outcomes emerge, particularly if actual policy objectives are different from stated ones.
Tropical forest policy making is often characterized by patronage politics and the presence of powerful
interest groups close to national policy makers (e.g. see Palmer, 2005; Amacher, 2006). This essentially
obscures the true motivations of policy makers (Mayers and Bass, 1998). Indeed, the recent ﬁnding
that government ofﬁcials in Liberia were bribed by carbon investors to secure carbon rights to a forest
concession at below-market values suggests that corruption is already playing an unwelcome role
in REDD policy (Financial Times, 2010). A rent-seeking policy maker is most likely to resemble the
income-maximizing policy maker in our framework. In this case, moving to a full information setting
could potentially exacerbate the problem.
Our model assumes an international price for forest carbon sinks that would otherwise be defor-
ested. Funding for REDD could be obtained by the host country either through an international
(regulated) carbon market and/or (voluntary) fund. Where the policy maker’s objective can be dis-
cerned truthfully, at least to some extent, the source of international funding becomes relevant. An
international market, like any market, will be indifferent to the objective of the policy maker and
hence, will not discriminate accordingly. A fund, on the other hand, may  have the ability to discrimi-
nate among types of policy maker. For example, it could choose to avoid REDD host governments with
a record of corruption or focus on those with well-governed environmental agencies. With this ﬂexibil-
ity, a fund-based ﬁnancing mechanism may  be better placed than a market to choose among competing
policy objectives particularly if REDD is not to focus on maximizing forest carbon services alone.
In addition to the informational setting, we remark on other simplifying features of our model, all
of which could be subject to further research. First, we ignored all possible types of transaction costs.
Such costs may  reduce the incentives for agents to participate (Anthon et al., 2007a). There are also
likely to be costs associated with obtaining information on agents’ opportunity costs. Where these are
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relatively low, policy makers aiming to maximize the amount of deforestation avoided or their own
income may  still ﬁnd it efﬁcient to obtain such information. The policy maker with a poverty alleviation
aim, on the other hand, may  have little incentive to do so. Yet, an incentive could be created if it has
certain preferences for how rents might be distributed, i.e. leading to the adoption of differentiated
payments instead of a uniform price across agents.
If obtaining information about opportunity costs is relevant, the question that follows is knowing
when reducing private information might be worthwhile. As our analysis shows, the answer depends,
to some degree, ﬁrst on the policy maker and its primary policy objective and second, on the distribu-
tion of costs and carbon outputs across the relevant sample of agents. Where payments are made by a
social planner, information rent is a transfer and not a welfare economic cost.9 It may  therefore have
little interest in reducing informational rents. If, however, the policy maker is rent seeking or a private
entity interested in maximizing proﬁts it may  seek to reduce informational rents. An environmental
agency focused on the quantitative output of its policies might be more sensitive to these rents and
could seek to reduce them more than say a social planner (see Anthon et al., 2007b).
Regarding the distribution of opportunity costs, where these vary greatly over the range of carbon
output then informational rents are likely to be large. Hence, ceteris paribus, they are more likely to
be worth reducing. If, on the other hand, there is relatively little variation then there will be relatively
few rents. In our Brazilian case, where the policy maker only seeks to enrol some portion of the land
available our data suggest relatively little variation in opportunity costs. Rents will therefore be mod-
est and it may  not be worthwhile reducing these given the costs involved. But in cases where there
is large variation in opportunity costs and where the policy maker either seeks to maximize income
or the quantity of avoided deforestation, it may  apply one of the following three methods (see also
Ferraro, 2008). First, screening contracts can be implemented to give landowners incentives to self-
select. Second, reverse auctions create a market in which potential participants compete with each
other, which, under certain conditions (the absence of collusion, mainly), can create an incentive to
reveal true opportunity costs. Finally, it could implement second-order discrimination by identifying
information strongly correlated with opportunity costs. The latter could be inferred from informa-
tion gathered from surveys similar to the one we undertook in Brazil. Ideally these data have to be
observable and costly to fake in order to avoid adverse selection.
Our model implicitly assumes secure land tenure along with clearly deﬁned and -enforced property
rights to the beneﬁts of forest use. These are generally considered to be a prerequisite for the effective
implementation of a REDD payments scheme. In reality, such conditions are unlikely to be found across
much of the tropics. Poorly deﬁned and/or -enforced property rights will almost certainly undermine
the basis for legitimate claims to the beneﬁts from any kind of payments scheme. If a policy maker has
difﬁculties determining which agent has de facto property rights then this will clearly reduce the set of
agents eligible for contracting into the REDD scheme. But where agents can contract into the scheme,
weak enforcement implies problems of contract compliance (see MacKenzie et al., 2011). Given such
uncertainty, we would expect the rent from REDD to be rather less than in situations where property
rights are reasonably well deﬁned and enforced. In turn, the policy maker would have fewer rents to
extract from a REDD scheme.
Finally, our framework assumes that policy makers’ objectives are conﬁned to deforestation agents
and their forest areas only (albeit with varying weight). Clearly, policy makers will have other, legiti-
mate concerns, also in terms of environmental and development objectives. For those with a broader
climate strategy, for example, carbon leakage is a major concern. In our model, we do not consider
the potential for agents to conserve forests on their land while choosing to deforest elsewhere. This
relates to the problems of weak property rights, which could increase the risk of leakage. A policy
maker looking to maximize the area of deforestation avoided is perhaps the one most likely to pay
attention to this issue.
9 If payments are funded by public funds, transfers may involve some fractional costs due to distortion (Anthon et al., 2007a),
but  we ignore these here.
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